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DEFUNIS, DEFUNCT
Jim Chen*
November 1998 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the Supreme Court's initial decision to accept a case presenting the question of race-conscious university admissions. This silver jubilee merits three cheers 1 for DeFunis v.
Odegaartf-and a moment of silence upon its passing. Call
it three ovations and a funeral.
Marco DeFunis, Jr., was initially denied admission to
the 1974 class of the University of Washington Law School.
Like many other law schools, Washington gave presumptive weight to an index based on undergraduate grades and
LSAT scores.3 The school's admissions procedures provided, however, that "all files of 'minority' applicants"defined as "Black Americans, Chicano Americans,
American Indians and Philippine Americans," but not
other Asian Americans-be "considered by the full
[admissions] committee" without regard to an individual
applicant's grades or scores. 4 Upon finding that the
minority admissions program resulted in the admission of
students less qualified than DeFunis, the King County
Superior Court ordered his admission to the class entering
in September 1971.5
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. It held,
first, "that the consideration of race as a factor in the admissions policy of a state law school is not a per se violation
of the equal protection clause." 6 Rejecting the argument
* Associate Professor of Law and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank Daniel Farber, David McGowan, Miranda
McGowan, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful suggestions.
1. That's one more cheer for DeFunis than the Chief Justice who oversaw the decision. See Daniel A. Farber, Two Cheers for Warren Burger, 4 Const. Comm. 1 (1987).
2. 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), granting cert to 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
3. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Wash. 1973) (footnote omitted), vacated, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
4. ld at 1174.
5. See id at 1176-77.
6. Id at 1181.
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that the racial classification at work "should be considered
'benign,"' the court required "the law school to show that
its consideration of race in admitting students is necessary
to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest." 7 In
the end, however, the court upheld the minority admissions
program, fearing that a contrary decision might "perpetuate[j indefinitely" the law school's state of "minority underrepresentation. " 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November
19, 1973. 9 The threat to educational affirmative action was
palpable. According to one journalistic account, "all nine
Justices leaned [initially] toward holding that ... fixed racial quotas" in university admissions "were unconstitutional."10 Even Justice Marshall feared that "uphold[ing]
[a] fixed quota for minorities might create an unfortunate
precedent which could be used eventually to exclude minorities."11 Another account reports that the Justices were
deeply divided and that Justice Brennan had amassed four
votes to permit some consideration of race in university
admissions. 12 A showdown over affirmative action seemed
unavoidable; neither the parties' briefs nor those of twentysix sets of amici identified a serious jurisdictional defect in
the case. 13
The Court eventually decided the case on mootness
grounds. DeFunis had all but finished his studies, and the
law school asserted that not even an adverse decision
would prevent his graduation. 14 What had begun as a debate among the Justices on the merits of affirmative action
turned into a jurisdictional battle. 15 The original and the
"strongest" proponent "of the mootness approach," 1" Justice Stewart "offered to write a per curiam declaring the
7. ld at 1182.
8. ld at 1184.
9. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), granting cert. to 507 P.2d 1169
(Wash. 1973).
10. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court
282 (Simon and Schuster, 1979).
11. Id.
12. See Bernard Schwartz, Behind Bakke: Affirmative Action and the Supreme
Court 33 (New York U. Press, 1988).
13. See Louis H. Pollack, DeFunis Non Est Disputandum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 495,
498 (1975).
14. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,317-19 (1974).
15. See Schwartz, Behind Bakke at 33 (cited in note 12).
16. ld.
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case moot." 17 As President Nixon's four appointees-the
Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist-acquiesced in this compromise, "[e]ven the
liberals breathed a sigh of relief that the case was gone. " 18
(Relieved though they might have been, the liberals took
pains to protest the mootness decision.t
On April 23, 1974, the Court vacated the judgment
below and remanded the case to the state supreme court. 20
On remand a fractured Washington Supreme Court denied
DeFunis's motion to designate the case a class action 21 and
instead reinstated its original judgment. 22 A few interested
observers took quiet pleasure in how the case ended not
with a bang but a whimper. 23
A mere four years later, the Bakke decision 24 fulfilled
the DeFunis dissenters' prediction that educational affirmative action would "inevitably return" to the Court. 25
Whereas DeFunis had allowed an aggrieved white student
to graduate without addressing the merits of affirmative action, Bakke approved race-conscious admissions in the
name of "diversity" even as it ordered its plaintiff admitted
to his chosen university. Although the Court has never revisited the question of affirmative action in a university setting,26 an entire generation of legal commentators has devoted more attention to Bakke than perhaps any other
Supreme Court decision. 27
17. Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren at 282 (cited in note 10).
18. Id
19. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 348 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Douglas, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
20. See id. at 320 (per curiam).
21. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 529 P.2d 438, 441-42 (Wash. 1974); cf. United States
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,404 (1980) ("[A]n action brought on behalf of
a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive claim,
even though class certification has been denied."); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402
(1975) ("[A] controversy may exist ... between a named defendant and a member of the
class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has
become moot.").
22. See De Funis, 529 P.2d at 444-45.
23. See Pollak, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 495 (cited in note 13).
24. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), denying cert. to 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996); Kirwan v. Podberesky, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995), denying cert. to 38 F.3d 147
(4th Cir. 1994); cf. Akhil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 1745, 1746 (1996) ("(T]he ... Court has said a lot about contracting and rather
little about education.").
27. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory
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Over the past two decades, DeFunis has gotten lost in
the constitutional cascade that followed Bakke. Legal
scholars have obsessed over the affirmative action guidelines outlined in Bakke and ignored the Court's close call in
DeFunis. Such are the perils of an academic tradition that
favors grand theory over less glamorous questions of practice, procedure, and pragmatic consequences. 28 Then again,
to the extent that Bakke is "the Kama Sutra of educational
affirmative action," 29 why would-or should-scholars
waste any time on the relatively pedestrian decision in DeFunis? Understandable though the preference for Bakke
over DeFunis might be, it has blinded us to three noteworthy aspects of the DeFunis decision. A single word expresses each of these: mootness, Realpolitik, and honesty.
Althou9oh DeFunis is regarded as a paragon of the passive virtues, the sheer complexity of its relationship with
mootness doctrine prevents us from treating it as a clear
triumph of jurisdiction over substance. With the passage of
time, DeFunis has taken its place in mootness doctrine as a
case of relatively modest stature. The Court conceded that
the law school's "voluntary cessation of [its] admissions
procedures"31 would not moot the case, a position well
grounded in prior and later cases. 32 DeFunis does appear,
especially when viewed in conjunction with a 1973 case
raising issues of mootness,33 to have represented a transiand Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 811, 906 (1998) ("What a colossal
waste this fixation has been"); Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147, 159-60 (1994) (describing the act of reading legal scholarship
on affirmative action as "a depressing experience").
28. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 Chi. Kent L.
Rev. 953, 958 (1997) (noting that scholarship in administrative law, which is increasingly
concerned with questions of "how best to regulate," looks "less like legal scholarship"
(emphasis in original)).
29. Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1123, 1127 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, Some Observations on the DeFunis Case, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 512,512-13 (1975); Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on
the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907,
911-16 (1983) (arguing that the Court intentionally avoided deciding DeFunis on its merits in order to shield affirmative action programs from direct attack); cf. Bernard
Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action 45 (Addison-Wesley,
1990) (using DeFunis to describe mootness doctrine and to locate the doctrine's role in
"Burger Court jurisprudence"). See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 115-98 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
31. De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487 (1980); United States v. W. T. Grant
Co., 345 U.S. 629,632 (1953).
33. Compare DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 318-19 (declining to treat the question raised by
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tion in the Court's thinking on cases "capable of repetition,
yet evading review." Earlier cases waived mootness objections whenever the defendant's alleged misconduct might
harm any member of the public. 34 Later cases insisted, in
accordance with DeFunis and Roe v. Wade, 35 that the recurring injury befall the plaintift_3" Finally, the Court's chosen
remedy in DeFunis-a decision to vacate and to remand
for further proceedings in state coure- has since fallen out
of favor. The Court now prefers to dismiss cases that become moot while on review from a state court, thereby preserving the underlying state court judgment.38 This outcome in DeFunis, which was open to the Justices, might
have transmitted a different message to the public.
In an age in which defensive settlement of a dreaded
Supreme Court case has become a leading civil rights strategy,39 DeFunis aptly symbolizes the subtle subversiveness of
the passive virtues. This much remains constant: the passive virtues of judicial avoidance cannot forever forestall
the a~gressive vices of academic debate. Like Nairn v.
Nairn before it, DeFunis could delay but not defuse an explosive racial controversy. 41 Even if Bakke had never come
along, DeFunis had already sparked the powder keg. No
matter what the Justices would do later, DeFunis put affirmative action on the docket in the court of legal commentary. Nothing, after all, stops professors from writing
DeFunis as one "capable of repetition, yet evading review") (quoting Southern Pacific
Terminal v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)
(applying this exception to mootness doctrine in order to review a challenge to a statute
banning abortion). See also Schwartz, Behind Bakke at 33 (cited in note 12) (reporting
that Justice Stewart distinguished DeFunis from Roe on mootness grounds during the
Justices' conference on DeFunis). See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911 ).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 546-57 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S 147, 149 (1975).
37. See 416 U.S. at 320.
38. See ASARCO Inc.~·. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,621 n.l (1989).
39. See Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997), vacating as moot
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
40. 350 u.s. 985 (1956).
41. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1839, 1855 (1996)
C'Just as the Court ducked the miscegenation issue in Nairn v. Nairn, it evaded the questiOn of preferential university admissions in De Funis v. Odegaard." (footnotes omitted)).
The Court, of course, invalidated laws against interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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about a topic that the Supreme Court has chosen to duck.
The case attracted two preeminent legal scholars, John
Hart Ely42 and Richard A. Posner,43 whose reactions to DeFunis arguably exhausted all available arguments in the affirmative action debate before it began. There was a time,
remote though it may seem now, when DeFunis alone
fueled the affirmative action debate. 44 It is true that many
a scholar "desperate for a topic for a tenure piece " 45 - or
even a topic for a job talk-has fallen into the trap of writing on affirmative action. Mere repetition, however, expunges none of the lethal qualities of a siren song. No one
should write on educational affirmative action who cannot
first demonstrate that he or she can augment the arguments
adduced so long ago by Ely and Posner.46
The fourth Justice among DeFunis's dissenters gives us
a second reason to laud the case. Ely and Posner did not
stand alone in reaching the merits underlying DeFunis; Justice Douglas joined them. He succinctly articulated what
has become the standard attack on educational affirmative
action: an applicant for admission to a public university has
"a constitutional right to have his application considered
on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner." 47
Progressives today often condemn Justice Douglas's
DeFunis dissent as an "angry" and "vehement" attack on
affirmative action. 48 But these critics rarely acknowledge
the depth of Justice Douglas's ambivalence about the subject. During the conference on DeFunis, Justice Douglas's
"typically maverick view[s]" emerged; in one breath he
criticized both race-conscious admissions and the use of
42. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974).
43. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 1.
44. See generally Robert M. O'Nei~ Discriminating Against Discrimination: Prefer·
entia/ Admissions and the DeFunis Case (Indiana U. Press, 1975); Ivor Kraft, DeFunis v.
Odegaard: Race, Merit, and the Fourteenth Amendment (Uncommon Lawyers Workshop,
1976); DeFunis Symposium, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 483 (1975).
45. Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 Const. Comm. 307,
309 n.9 (1986).
46. As with all other articles "present[ing] ... a meta-theory about [legal] scholarship," this "Article's thesis ... does not apply to itself." Daniel A. Farber, The Case
Against Brilliance, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 917, 930 n.56 (1986).
47. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. E.g., Michael A. Olivas, Legal Norms in Law School Admissions: An Essay on
Parallel Universes, 42 J. Legal Educ. 103, 109 n.35 (1992).
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standardized tests. 49 Before the Court settled on its mootness resolution, he evidently "circulated an opinion ruling
out affirmative action, withdrew it the next day, and then
substituted a draft saying that race could be taken into account."50 In the opinion he actually published, Justice
Douglas advocated considerable "leeway" for admissions
officers who rendered "educational decision(s]" according
to "proper guidelines." 51 He thus foreshadowed the "plus
factor" approach that would eventually prevail in Bakke,52
without succumbing to the fiction that a putatively flexible
preference policy would operate any differently than quotas.53 His proposals to abolish the LSAT' and to administer
direct tests of an apRlicant's propensity to work in underserved communities 5 resonate with many contemporary
proposals for reform. 56 Like President Clinton after him,
Justice Douglas ultimately decided to try mending affirmative action without ending it. 57
A decade before DeFunis, Justice Douglas had signaled his hostility to race-conscious measures in a voting
49. Schwartz, Behind Bakke at 33 (cited in note 12).
50. Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren at 282 (cited in note 10).
51. De Funis, 416 U.S. at 344 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. See id at 340-41 ("There is ... no bar to considering an individual's prior
achievements in light of the racial discrimination that barred his way, as a factor in attempting to assess his true potential for a successful ... career."); cf. Larry M. Lavinsky,
The Affirmative Action Trilogy and Benign Racial Classifications-Evolving Law in Need
of Standards, 27 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 7 (1980) (describing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
as "reminiscent of the Douglas dissent in De Funis").
53. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 332-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 559, 560-61 (1975); cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that there is no material difference between a fixed quota and a
"plus factor" approach, except that the fixed quota is more obvious and honest).
54. See De Funis, 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. See id at 341.
56. Cf Larry M. Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Decision" with a Message, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 520,533 (1975) ("Justice Douglas has sought to shift the focus of
the selection process from racial preference and quotas towards one in which the educationally, culturally and economically disadvantaged, no less than other applicants, are
afforded an opportunity for admission commensurate with their ability and potential.");
Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration of
America Denying the Impact of Race, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1089, 1115 (1993) ("Justice
Douglas's De Funis opinion appears to be the genesis of the concept of basing affirmative
action on socio-economic factors, rather than race."). See generally Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action (BasicBooks, 1996) (proposing
class-based affirmative action as a substitute for the race-based variant).
57. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 344 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I cannot conclude that
the admissions procedure of the Law School of the University of Washington ... is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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rights case made obscure by the passage of time. Justice
Douglas's dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller's posited that
"government has no business designing electoral districts
along racial ... lines" under any circumstances. 59 He anticipated and squarely rejected the "benign intent" argument invoked in later affirmative action cases. 60 He surely
would have mocked the "separate but better off' theory
that motivates minority student housing and other racially
exclusive measures in many universities today.6' The seeds
that Justice Douglas planted in Wright would bloom three
decades later in the astonishing flurry of voting rights decisions beginning with Shaw v. Reno.62 Quite significantly,
Justice Goldberg joined Justice Douglas in Wrighf 3 and
wrote a separate dissent that Justice Douglas joined in
turn. 64 In this alliance between two of the Warren Court's
leading liberals lurked the kernel of two divisive debatesaffirmative action and race-conscious redistricting-that
would eventually split the heirs of the civil rights movement65 and the Democratic Party. 66 Scholars are only beginning to realize the true instability of the disparate racial,
gender-based, and economic components of the modern
progressive coalition. 67
We ought not be surprised that DeFunis, Wright, and
attitudes about official race-consciousness have all come
full circle during the span of a single human generation.
Twenty-five years is a relatively long time for the Supreme
Court to complete a constitutional hiccough. Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 68 Wolf v. Colorado, 69 and National League of
58. 376 u.s. 52 (1964).
59. Id at 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. Compare id at 61 ("Racial segregation that is state-sponsored should be nullified whatever may have been intended." (emphasis added)) with Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (subjecting "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress" to intermediate rather than strict judicial scrutiny).
61. See Wright, 376 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Johnson v. DeGrandy,
512 u.s. 997 (1994).
63. See Wright, 376 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. See id at 67 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
65. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1327-28 (1986).
66. See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 Cal.
L. Rev. 893,897-98 (1994).
67. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abonion,
Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 731 (1997).
68. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Cities v. Userl 0 all retreated into bad legal memory in less
time. Metro Broadcasting, the most aggressive of the
Court's affirmative action decisions, died after a mere five
years. 71 If indeed "[o]ur Constitution is a covenant running
from" generation to generation, "[ e ]ach generation must
[reject] anew ... ideas and aspirations" not fit to "survive
more ages than one." 72
Honesty, a rare commodity in the affirmative action
debate/3 is the third and final reason to revere DeFunis.
The University of Washington confessed at oral argument
that none of the students who benefited from its law
school's minority admissions program "would have been
admitted" had their applications been "considered under
the same procedure as was generally used." 74 For much of
the next quarter century, universities would abandon the
candor that characterized the University of Washington's
defense in DeFunis. Georgetown University swiftly punished a student who had the audacity to report the truth
about its law school admissions office. 75 Violent debates
turn on the extent to which racial considerations affect admissions decisions. 76 Only slowly has the American academic establishment come to confess its dependence on affirmative action in ensuring more than token numbers of
black, Hispanic, and American Indian students.n
The academy's addiction to affirmative action may be
coming to an abrupt end. On November 3, 1998, nearly a
69. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
70. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
71. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); cf. Neil Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 125, 128 (1990) (predicting accurately that Metro Broadcasting was the most doctrinally unstable of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions).
72 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,901 (1992).
73. See Farber, 82 Cal. L. Rev. at 933 (cited in note 66).
74. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75. See Michel Marriott, White Accuses Georgetown Law School of Bias in Admitting Blacks, N.Y. Times A13 (Apr. 15, 1991)
76. Compare Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School
Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1997) with Stephan Themstrom, Dh·ersity
and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education, "15 Const. Comm. 11 (1998).
77. See William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton U.
Press, 1998).
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quarter century after the grant of certiorari in DeFunis,
Washington voters approved Initiative 200, a referendum
barring race- and sex-based preferences in the public sector. In response to the passage of I-200, the University of
Washington has suspended the use of race and ethnicity in
admissions. The university has also confessed that 88 of
the 373 black, Hispanic, and American Indian students in
its current freshman class would not have been admitted
under a race-blind admissions system.78 In issuing "more
complete published standards for admission," the University of Washington has finally fulfilled the wishes expressed
by several sympathetic state judges so many years ago. 79
And so the sun sets on affirmative action at the University of Washington, almost twenty-five years to the day
after the Supreme Court decided to review the practice.
The passage of Initiative 200, especially when viewed in
conjunction with the passage of California Initiative 209,80
repeats the three salient themes of DeFunis: mootness (albeit in an informal rather than doctrinal sense), conflict between the legal theory and the political reality of official
race-consciousness, and cold, hard honesty. In death as in
its brief life, DeFunis merits a tribute befitting an unsung
hero.

78. See Steven A. Holmes, Victorious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields,
N.Y. Times A25 (Nov. 10, 1998).
79. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (Wash. 1973) (Wright, J., joined by
Finley & Stafford, JJ., concurring), vacated, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
.
80. See generally Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Clr.
1997); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Gu~~e, .44
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1335 (1997). Unlike California Initiative 209, Washington ImtlatJve
200 carries the legal weight of a statute rather than that of an amendment to the state
constitution. Lacking the status of fundamental law, Initiative 200 must be construed in
pari materia with other state laws. More important, perhaps, it is vulnerable to repeal by
ordinary legislation.

